Assets are interrelated in risk analysis methodologies for information systems promoted by international standards. This means that an attack on one asset can be propagated through the network and threaten an organization's most valuable assets. It is necessary to valuate all assets, the direct and indirect asset dependencies, as well as the probability of threats and the resulting asset degradation. These methodologies do not, however, consider uncertain valuations and use precise values on different scales, usually percentages. Linguistic terms are used by the experts to represent assets values, dependencies and frequency and asset degradation associated with possible threats. Computations are based on the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers associated with these linguistic terms.
INTRODUCTION
Information Systems (IS) are composed of a set of data management elements designed to provide services and benefits in areas as far a part as public administration, industrial control, the banking or geographical and weather information.
Technological developments and the universal internet access has led to an increase in system vulnerabilities. Therefore, ISs have to be analysed with a view to risk minimization by means of well-planned actions to protect information, processes and services from possible threats. Threats range from act of terrorism, industrial espionage, etc., or even a simple unintentional human error by an operator.
Standards promoted by the International Organization for Standardization [ISO/IEC](2005 , 2011 on IS security suggest three-stage risk analysis and management methodologies.
The planning stage establishes the necessary points for starting up the project, defines objectives, and identifies participants and competencies. The analysis stage identifies the IS assets, as well as their relations (dependencies), the threats to which they are exposed and their frequency and asset degradation levels. Finally, the risk management stage determines the safeguards and strategies that reduce impact and risk.
In this paper, we focus on the second stage, analysis. Assets are the IS or related resources, necessary for an organization's correct operation and for achieving the goals set by its manager. Assets can be data, applications, software, facilities, hardware, services...
The asset dependencies are usually represented in terms of percentages, signalling how likely the failure of an asset is to affect another.
Often only a few elements {terminal assets), usually data or services, account for the total value of an organization's assets. The value of these assets is transferred to other assets through the established dependency relations. Thus, non-terminal assets have no intrinsic values; they accumulate their value from terminal assets.
However, the methodologies based on international standards, such us (Lopez Crespo, AmutioGomez, Candau and Manas, 2006a , 2006b , 2006c (Stoneburner and Gougen, 2002) , obviate the difficulty of correctly assigning asset dependencies, as well as terminal asset values or the impact on the entire system caused by the materialization of a threat to an asset. Moreover, these methodologies do not consider uncertainty concerning these assessments.
In this paper we propose a fuzzy risk analysis in IS as a solution to these deficiencies.
Section 2 reviews some operations on trapezoidal fuzzy numbers and introduces a fuzzy evaluation of asset dependencies. Section 3 provides a fuzzy fivecomponent valuation of assets on the basis of five components is provided. Threats and asset risk impact indicators are described in Section 4. In Section 5, we introduce the similarity function used to associate a linguistic term from a set with a trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. Finally, some conclusions and future research are discussed in Section 6.
FUZZY VALUATION OF DEPENDENCIES
We use the following arithmetic for fuzzy numbers proposed in (Xu, Shang, Qian and Shul, 2010) : If Ai = (ai, bi, ci, d\) and A 2 = (a 2 , b 2 , c 2 , d 2 ), then
As mentioned above, the assets in IS are connected by dependency relationships, and a failure of one asset may affect other assets. Asset Aj depends on the asset A t (or A t influences Aj), denoted by (A t , Aj) (graphically A t -> Aj), if a failure in asset A t causes a failure in the asset Aj with any given probability. This probability is usually referred to as the degree of dependency of Aj with respect to A t or the influence of At over Aj, which we denote it by dd(A t , Aj).
Proposed IS risk analysis methodologies (MAGERIT, MEHARI, OCTAVE...) assign just a percentage to indicate the degree of dependency between two assets, and sometimes even propose the use of a Boolean value indicating whether or not this dependency exists regardless of the degree of dependency. We propose the use of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to represent these dependencies. Consequently, the experts can build a linguistic term set to intuitively define the dependency between two assets under uncertainty.
Our aim then is to compute the indirect asset dependencies since assets values are accumulated from terminal assets through these dependencies.
The degree of dependency of asset A k with respect to Aj, DD(Ai, A k ), is computed as follows 1 . We denote by P={Pi,..., P s } the set of paths in the analysis of the influence of At over Ak. Then, A) If all assets (excluding A t and A k ) in the paths in P are influenced by only one asset, then
7=1
1 To avoid ambiguity, we will write "DD" to refer to total dependency between two assets separated by other intermediate assets, and "dd" when they are directly connected.
where 
(2) Note that transactions between trapezoidal fuzzy numbers representing linguistic terms from a set in [0,1] will remain in [0,1], and the results of these operations can be translated into one of the linguistic terms of the set by means of a similarity function. Furthermore, the operation © is consistent with the methodologies established for risk analysis and management in IS, allowing performances in probabilistic terms.
FUZZY VALUATION OF ASSETS
MAGERIT defines the value of an asset as the losses that would be sustained if the respective asset is no longer available. These can be losses of money, user confidence, the organizational prestige... Assets are usually evaluated taking into account the following five components (Lopez Crespo et al., 2006a , 2006b , 2006c ):
• Confidentiality. How much damage would it cause if the asset is disclosed to someone it should not be? This is a typical data inspection.
• Integrity. How much damage would it cause if the asset is damaged or corrupt? This is a typical data inspection. Data can be manipulated, be wholly or partially false, or even missing.
• Authenticity. How much damage would it cause if we do not exactly know who has done what? This is a typical services (user authentication) and data (authenticity of the person accessing data to write or read) inspection.
• • Availability. How much damage would it cause if the asset is not available or cannot be used? This is a typical services inspection.
Only the terminal assets have an associated value for the above components. The other assets accumulate value from terminal assets on the basis of dependency relationships. We again use the set of linguistic terms that represent trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to represent uncertainty when valuating the terminal assets. guistic term assigned by an expert for the Ah value component in asset Aj. If we denote by TAS the terminal asset set, then the value of asset Aj with respect to terminal assets is:
THREATS
Next, we assess threats and estimate indicators of the impact on and risk to assets. A threat is an event that can trigger an incident in our organization, causing damage or intangible material loss to the assets, and an attack is any deliberate action aimed at violating the IS security mechanisms. MAGERIT suggests two threat assessment measures: degradation, the damage that the threat can cause to the asset, and frequency, how often the threat materializes. We will again use fuzzy linguistic terms rather than percentages and probabilities to represent degradation and frequency. A threat is a vector u = (D, f) whose components are degradation and frequency.
Note that the degradation has to be established for each the the five asset components described in the previous section, ,d 2 ,d 3 ,d4,d 5 ), i.e., the threat causes a degradation d t in the Ah component of the asset. Let us consider a threat on the asset Aj. When the threat is realized, each component is affected by the expression
where Ij,, is the impact on the Ah component of the attacked asset (Aj). We use Eq. (4) below to compute the risk to the attacked asset _ _ _ R J(l) =i J(l) ®f-(4) After computing the impact caused by a materialized threat on an asset, we can compute the impact transmitted from the attacked asset to its dependent assets. If Aj is the asset on which the threat has materialized and the degree of dependency of Aj with respect to A k is DD{A k , Aj), then the attack on asset Aj
SIMILARITY FUNCTION
A similarity function is required to associate the resulting trapezoidal fuzzy number with an element in the linguistic term set. This function can also be used at any step of the methodology to derive the linguistic terms associated with the respective trapezoidal fuzzy numbers output to represent dependencies, accumulated values... Several authors have proposed different similarity functions, which are based on the centroid of a fuzzy number and the distance between the components of the fuzzy numbers, see (Lee, 1999; Chen 2001, 2007) . Finally, a more recent similarity function was proposed in (Xu et al., 2010 ) and compared with the proposal reported in (Chen and Chen, 2007) .
We use the function proposed in Vicente, Mateos and Jimenez (2012) , which considers another parameter consisting of the ratio between the common area and the joint area under the membership functions of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. Moreover, we use the distance 7co between centroids since the use of distances with non-rectangular spheres is inconsistent with the intuitive perception of similarity. Note that w\, w 2 and w-5 represent the relative importance of the three elements considered in the similarity function. Analysts will assign the values that best fits their own model.
CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a fuzzy risk analysis model for information systems that conforms to international standards, particularly the MAGERIT methodology. The model is an improvement on this and other existing methodologies since it includes uncertainty about the assessments by means of linguistic terms, which have associated trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. The proposed methodology makes computations on the basis of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to accumulate dependencies between assets and asset valuations and to determine impacts and risk from the threat degradation and frequency, respectively. Moreover, similarity functions can be used at any step in the methodology to derive a linguistic term for the trapezoidal fuzzy number output.
